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W. Casey, who is considered to be the most 
powerful director of the CIA in the history of 
the organization, wrote in his book: “In our time 
it is especially important to understand how 
necessary intelligence, covert operations and 
organized resistance movements are ... In the 
future, in crisis situations, these methods can 
be more productive than missiles and satellites. 
Their success tells us to use dissidents against the 
powerful centers and totalitarian governments”1. 
Both complex character and high relevance of 
the “color revolutions” in the past decade in the 
Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan count in favor 
of careful consideration of these methods. 
The founder of the humanitarian technology2 
of “strategic nonviolent struggle” that underlies 
“color revolutions” is G. Sharp. At the beginning 
of his career he was researching the teachings of 
civil disobedience of G.D. Toro and M.K. Gandhi. 
He devoted a separate monograph to the ideas 
and practices of the latter3. Of course, G. Sharp 
was familiar with the works of many thinkers. In 
particular, he was close in his views were close to 
the views of the 16th century French philosopher 
Etienne de la Boétie. The latter asserted the 
following: “If they (the tyrants) are not provided 
with anything, if they are not being obeyed, 
without fighting, without opposition, they remain 
naked and broken, and there is nothing they can 
afford, as a sprout, which dries up and dies, if 
the root has no soil”4. However, the particular 
importance of the Gandhism is clear based upon 
the fact that the founder of the latter, as well as 
the American political researcher, was not only a 
theoretician, but also a practicing politician. The 
views of the Indian thinker was reflected in the 
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work of the follower and colleague of G. Sharp, a 
retired colonel, R.L. Helvey: Gandhi appears there 
in the chapter devoted to the political thinkers, 
most significant for strategic nonviolent struggle 
(in a non-trivial company with N. Machiavelli 
and C. Clausewitz)5. Thus, a certain relation of 
the technology of nonviolent revolutions with 
the doctrine of Satyagraha (perseverance in the 
truth) is beyond any doubt.
According to the theory of M.K. Gandhi, 
violence only breeds violence, while non-
violence breaks this vicious spiral. Satyagraha is 
based on the desire to influence the judgment and 
conscience of the opponent through non-violence 
(ahimsa), and the willingness to endure pain and 
suffering. An important element of this teaching 
is to avoid interaction with the authorities in the 
forms prescribed by the sovereign. The followers 
of M.K. Gandhi refused to buy British goods, 
receive government titles and awards, to be on the 
civil and military service, boycotted schools and 
administrative offices, while creating alternative 
social structures. The example was Mahatma 
himself, who in 1920 returned the rewards for his 
participation in the wars in South Africa to the 
King6, and four years later, protested against his 
early release from prison, not wanting favorsfrom 
the government7.
“The rights also entail obligations to the 
state”, young M.K. Gandhi thought once started 
his legal practice in South Africa8. He faced 
the arbitrariness of British colonial officials 
and came to the conclusion that, by refusing to 
meet the state face to face, the citizens thereby 
make the latter inoperative. Among the most 
successful examples of such policies is refusal of 
the Bardoli District to pay the land tax (resulting 
in tax reduction)9, as well as demonstrative and 
widespread violation of the salt monopoly of the 
government (400 km trip to the seacoast)10. There 
were fires with British goods all over India11. It 
got to the point that the Indians ignored the visit 
of the Crown Prince of Wales. The streets of the 
cities along the route of the Prince seemed dead at 
the time of his presence12. And in 1946, after the 
Indian National Congress adopted the anti-British 
resolution “Get out of India!”, Gandhi said: “Each 
of us from now on should consider him-/herself a 
free man or a woman and act as if we had already 
got free of imperialism”13.
The symbol of Satyagraha was Charkha, a 
traditional Indian spinning wheel. The followers 
of this teaching did not buy British textile 
products, preferring their own homespun goods14. 
M.K. Gandhi demanded from his followers to 
work personally on a manual spinning wheel. He 
reasoned it this way: “Why do I, who does not 
have to work to be fed, also need to spin? Because 
I eat something that does not belong to me. I 
live by the labor of my fellow citizens”15. Thus, 
spinning was not only a symbol, but a way of 
ensuring the socio-cultural integrity of the highly 
fragmented Indian society. Breaking the ties 
that bound his country with England, Mahatma 
simultaneously spun threads to unite India itself. 
It is a paradox that decades before this “jewel 
of the British Empire” got it’s independence. 
M.K. Gandhi spent most of his efforts not to fight 
the mother country, but to consolidate India. To 
do this, he worked on the reconciliation of the 
supporters of Hinduism and Islam16, as well as on 
the integration of “untouchable” into the Indian 
society”17.
The tactics of the Indian political strategist 
that met both objective geopolitical and geo-
economic realities and traditions of the Indian 
society, proved to be extremely effective. It 
is worth noting that it is deeply rooted in the 
Indian spiritual tradition18. It is known that the 
true followers of Satyagraha were supposed 
to make a vow of truth, non-violence or love, 
innocence, refusal from property, etc. (by the 
way M.K. Gandhi was influenced in his views by 
ideas of L.N. Tolstoy)19. An important component 
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of the movement was voluntary acceptance of a 
martyred mission by its participants20. However, 
the great Hindu called himself a “practical 
idealist” and intended his theory of non-violence 
not for angels or saints, but for ordinary people21. 
Moreover, Mahatma said that he “would rather 
prefer that India resorted to arms to defend its 
honor, than it became a helpless victim of its own 
dishonor because of its cowardice...”22.
The final chapter of G. Sharp’s monograph 
“Gandhi as a Political Strategist” is called 
“Non-violence: a moral principle or a political 
technology?” The author tends to dispose of the 
widespread opinion that the use of nonviolent 
means in India was determined by spiritual, 
religious or psychological features of the 
Hindus23. He also drops a thought about the 
difference between non-violence as ethics and 
nonviolent acts as a practical technology24. To 
prove it he uses quotations from the works of 
M.K. Gandhi, in particular from the letter dated 
July 1943, where he wrote: “I admit that there 
are many of those, who totally follow my theory 
of non-violence. Nevertheless, one should not 
forget my other words: for my movement it is 
not necessary that all its participants are the 
followers of this theory, to some extent or totally. 
It is enough if people simply follow the rules of 
nonviolent acts”25.
G. Sharp and his followers went the way 
of universalisation and instrumentalization 
of the teaching of nonviolent struggle. They 
decided to bring this teaching to the level of 
a technology, providing the application of the 
humanitarian arms of the East against itself. As 
noted by G. Sharp himself in conversation with 
R.L. Helvey, “strategic nonviolent struggle deals 
with mastering of the political power and depriving 
it of others. It has no relation to pacifism, moral 
or religious beliefs”26. If M.K. Gandhi considered 
the idea “to seek one’s rescue looking for the 
external forces and the help from other countries” 
to be dangerous, the followers of G. Sharp used 
the latter without any doubt. 
As MGIMO professor M.A. Khrustalev 
notes, before the presidency of R. Reagan the 
traditional foreign policy of the United States 
was the support of the military dictatorships 
(especially in Latin America). After this, the line 
had changed and, leaving his post, this head of 
the United States said that during his rule forty 
dictatorships were deprived27. Such a change in 
the foreign policy claimed the theory and practice 
of “peaceful revolutions”.
In 1983, G. Sharp created a programme of 
nonviolent actions at the Center for International 
Affairs at Harvard University. His first research 
was focused on the possibilities of applying the 
tactics of civil disobedience by the population of 
Eastern Europe in the event of invasion of armed 
forces of the Warsaw Pact Organization. In 
parallel, this political expert organized the Albert 
Einstein Institute of Boston28, which started 
active practical activities since late 1980s29. 
The first major “client” was the Democratic 
Alliance of Burma. In this country, now 
called the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 
technologists of nonviolent struggle worked for 
years. This is where R.L. Helvey joined them. 
Moreover, the members of the Institute worked 
with the progressive party of Taiwan and with 
the supporters of Dalai Lama, took part in the 
overthrow of M. Noriega in Panama. Two weeks 
before the beginning of the infamous Tiananmen 
Square incident G. Sharp and B. Jenkins arrived 
in Beijing 30. 
One of the most successful projects of the 
Albert Einstein Institute was the support of the 
separatist movements in the Soviet Baltic31. As 
stated in the work by G. Sharp, his book “Civil 
Defense: the Post-war Weapon System” was 
actively spread in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, 
and the author himself, along with his associate 
B. Jenkins worked in these republics in November-
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December 1991. Later this book was published in 
Latvia with forewords of the former and current 
ministers of defense of this republic32. According 
to the apologetic articles in the European mass 
media, the organization of G. Sharp was involved 
in the recent events of the Arab Spring33. The 
official website of the Institute has versions not 
only in Chinese, Arabic and Burma languages, but 
also in Serbian, Kyrgyz, Ukrainian, Belarusian, 
and, of course, Russian. 34.
The Albert Einstein Institute is not a 
monopolist. The International Centre for Non-
violent Conflicts headed by Dr. Ackerman and 
former military J. DuVall, also “promotes and 
encourages the use of nonviolent civil strategy 
with a view to establish and protect democracy 
and human rights around the world ... and 
provides assistance in training and sending field 
instructors to deepen the theoretical knowledge 
and practical skills to use nonviolent methods in 
conflicts around the world”35.
R.L. Helvey determines the mass 
disobedience as “nonviolent struggle (protest, 
non-cooperation), strongly and actively applied 
for political purposes”36. According to G. Sharp, 
the term is intended to distinguish nonviolent 
struggle against pacifism and moral or religious 
non-resistance. It is a deliberate challenge to the 
authorities, a refusal to obey. This technology is 
used in the political sphere, it’s purpose is the 
political power. The term is used to denote actions 
that help to intercept the control of dictatorship 
over state institutions37.
G. Sharp considers that “after all, political 
power is based on social cooperation and actions 
of the masses, but not on violence”38. He asserts: 
“When nonviolent actions are performed by 
many people and the main social institutes, 
they are able to paralyze and even destroy what 
they were aimed at39. It seems that peaceful 
movement should be interested in achieving 
consensus with the authorities by negotiations, 
but G. Sharp doubts this way of solving conflicts. 
He concedes negotiations only as a tactic 
means: “If Democrats agree to stop resistance 
in response to stop repressions, they may be 
disappointed. This happens seldom”40. It is worth 
noting that even though M.K. Gandhi abandoned 
negotiations (in particular, with Lord Reading in 
1919)41, he often held them successfully finding 
mutual compromises with the colonial authorities 
(for example, Deli Pact of 1931)42. In general, 
Mahatma thought that Satyagraha requires not 
saving efforts to achieve worthy agreements with 
opponents43.
R.L. Helvey in his characteristics of 
strategic nonviolent struggle uses a typical 
military analogue: “Military victory is achieved 
by destruction of the potential of the opponent 
and (or) his/her will to continue the fight. In this 
respect nonviolent struggle is different from an 
armed conflict only in the systems of weapons”44. 
He also writes: “Like artillery changed the 
nature of war in the times of Machiavelli, the 
technology gave us opportunities to change 
the way of conducting nonviolent conflicts. 
Computers, Internet access, mobile and 
satellite phones, coding programmes, television 
and radio are the main weapons of nonviolent 
struggle”45.
G. Sharp asserts that the beginning of 
nonviolent struggle requires solving of four first-
priority tasks: “to strengthen resolution, self-
belief and ability to struggle in the depressed 
people; to strengthen independent social groups 
and institutes of the depressed people; to create 
strong internal resistance; to prepare a reasonable 
strategic plan and put it into practice” 46. He also 
names “three key factors that determine to which 
extent the power of the government will remain 
uncontrolled: 1) relative desire of the population 
to limit its power; 2) relative power of independent 
organizations and institutes that aim at shutting 
off the sources of such power; 3) relative ability 
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of the population to refuse the authorities in 
agreement and support”47.
Strategic nonviolent struggle is not an 
extemporaneous creativity of the masses48. 
As R.L. Helvey underlines “It is not a 
happening, but a well planned and realized 
strategy of destructing the dictatorship”49. 
Struggle involves development and successive 
implementation of a general strategy, which is 
specified in strategy, tactics and methods. First 
of all, strategists should answer some questions: 
“What prevents from achieving freedom? What 
may help to achieve it? What aspects of the 
dictatorship are particularly strong? What are its 
weaknesses? How vulnerable is the source of its 
power? What are the strengths of the Democrats 
and the population as a whole? What are the 
weaknesses of the democratic forces, and how 
they may be overcome? What is the status of 
third parties indirectly involved in the conflict, 
which help or could help either the dictatorship 
or the democratic movement?”50.
Strategic planning “requires deep 
understanding of the whole situation of the conflict, 
including physical, historical, government, 
military, cultural, social, political, psychological, 
economic, and international factors. Strategies 
can be developed only in the context of a 
particular struggle and its background”51. That is 
why it is impossible” to create a general strategic 
plan, which can fit all liberation movements. Each 
struggle for the overthrow of the dictatorship and 
establishment of democracy will be different 
in a way”52. As noted by G.W.F. Hegel, every 
nation “has such special circumstances, every 
era happens to be such an individual condition 
that ... it is necessary and possible to make only 
those decisions that are derived from this very 
condition”53.
Talking about the qualities the strategists 
require, G. Sharp himself turns to the military 
analogy: “In order to prepare a military strategy, 
military officers get to know the structure, tactics, 
logic, ammunition, geographical features, etc.; in 
the same way, developing a plan of nonviolent 
struggle, it is necessary to understand the nature 
and the strategic principles of nonviolent struggle. 
However, knowledge alone will not create the 
strategy. To formulate the strategy of the fight, 
we need information and creative spirit”54. 
“The inefficiency of template approaches and 
stereotyped solutions is due to the fact that “the 
conflict, where political defiance is applied is a 
constantly changing battlefield of action and 
reaction”55.
If Machiavelli appeals to the wise sovereign 
“to take measures to ensure that citizens always 
and under all circumstances have the need for the 
sovereign and the state”56, G. Sharp offers “the 
fighters against the dictatorship to achieve exactly 
the opposite: “development of autonomous (social, 
economic, political and cultural) institutions is 
consistently expanding the democratic space 
and narrowing the control of the dictatorship”57. 
In some cases, he finds it possible to develop 
a “parallel” (alternative) government, which 
citizens and civil institutions will be ready to 
obey. “Then the dictatorship will gradually but 
with an increasing speed get deprived of the 
properties of the government”58 
If French students rioted in 1968 with the 
slogan “Be realistic: demand the impossible!”59, 
the “strategic nonviolent struggle” avoids such 
an approach. G. Sharp urges the opposition not 
to overestimate its strengths (in particular, to 
avoid the repetition of the events of 1989 in the 
Tiananmen Square). If the “frontal attack” at this 
stage of the struggle does not lead to the desired 
result, the political analyst recommends to resort 
to “selective strategies of resistance”. They 
suggest the concentration of forces “on specific 
issues: social, economic or political. They should 
be chosen in such a way, that a part of the social 
and political system remains beyond the control 
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of dictators or gets out of it, and also that the 
plans of the authorities are hindered”. Such a 
campaign should strike “at the vulnerabilities of 
the dictatorship”60.
G. Sharp emphasizes that the opposition 
should use “weaknesses” of the authorities. 
Among them he names the following typical 
features: “The system can be inert, that is less 
able to adapt quickly to new situations”, “being 
afraid of angering the chiefs, subordinates may 
give inaccurate or incomplete information, which 
prevents the dictators from taking appropriate 
decisions”, “ineptitude and ignorance of the 
bureaucratic apparatus or excessive control 
can extremely reduce the functioning of the 
system”61. Generally speaking, the political 
analyst states, that “despite its apparent strengths, 
all dictatorships have weaknesses: internal 
inefficiency, institutional inefficiency, personal 
feuds and conflicts between organizations and 
departments”62.
Therefore, it is appropriate to recall on a 
general pattern determined by A. Toffler: “Every 
system ... can only operate at a certain speed. Too 
slow –and it gets disintegrated, too fast –and it 
shatters. All systems are composed of subsystems 
that operate in a similar manner only within the 
certain velocity amplitude”63. Imposing a higher 
rate of a combat, the opposition could gain an 
advantage if the authorities are not ready for 
such a mode. As pointed out by V. Shved, in 
1990, the Lithuanian “Sąjūdis” responded to all 
the statements of Moscow within a day or two, 
while it took Moscow up to two months or more 
to respond. In fact, the Centre responded when 
the urgency of the problem has already been 
exhausted64.
G. Sharp also recommends to use the 
sharpening of class, cultural or ethnic conflicts65. 
The researcher notes that both in Georgia and the 
Ukraine “real social problems and stress were 
used to launch the revolutionary flywheel”66. 
Indeed, as A. Toffler wrote, “... when the system is 
highly unstable, non-linear effects are multiplied. 
Great efforts of the authorities can give small 
results. Slight circumstances may initiate the 
collapse of the regime. Like an overtoasted slice 
of bread may lead to divorce”67.
R.L. Helvey recommends to turn to the 
involvement of all the forces of the civil society 
into the struggle. He points out that almost all 
organizations “contain the sources of power, and 
provide a framework for collective actions”68. 
This is quite logical because, as noted by V.V. Iliin 
and A. Panarin the communities “have inherent 
behavioural features and forms that are not typical 
for individuals: they are formed not in the process 
of an individual life, but during the collective 
mutual development, interaction (multiplication 
of the merger of personal energies, combinative 
reflexes, imitation, suggestion”69. 
Talking about the organizational structure of 
the nonviolent movements, R.L. Helvey notes that 
a hierarchy is not typical for it. “The general way 
to get together different interests, abilities and 
personalities, or opposition groups is to develop 
an “umbrella” organization for the purpose of 
struggling. The other way is, when the latter 
develops its own “headquarters core”, which 
represents all or some of the members. Initially, 
it may be better to combine the participating 
organizations around the issues rather than trying 
to create a unified organization”70. 
However, towards the end of the book 
R.L. Helvey determines “the opinion that the 
struggle for democracy requires democratic 
organizational structures for the management of 
the conflict as erroneous. This is a nonviolent, but, 
nevertheless, war. It requires leadership and strict 
discipline”71. “As in any war, decision-making 
by a committee is inappropriate. Ideally, at the 
strategic level, someone must be responsible 
for deciding when and where the campaign will 
be carried out, while other individuals should 
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be responsible for carrying out these fights and 
campaigns. At each level within the movement, 
the task should not be set without specifying the 
person responsible for its implementation. The 
responsibility is always individual”72. Herewith, 
the author mentions, that one-man management 
does not deny broad participation in preparation 
and presentation of recommendations for the 
decision-making person73.
R.L. Helvey frankly writes about the 
suitability of foreign experts’ participation in 
“nonviolent struggle”, who have a wealth of 
knowledge and skills74. Answering the tough 
questions of the opponents in this respect, the role 
of foreigners should be positioned as “necessary 
technical assistance, which has no governing 
authority and is strictly accountable”75. It is worth 
noting, that during training and consulting of new 
generations of “freedom fighters” he advises to 
attract “veterans of nonviolent conflicts” having 
proved themselves useful in other countries”76.
A. Butkevicius, a Lithuanian student of 
G. Sharp, emphasizes: “In the Soviet Union in 
the military environment there were no designed 
psychological operations, everybody acted using 
a single, very primitive scheme”77.
As noted by D. Fraser, propaganda is “an 
activity or art that makes people behave the 
way they would not have behaved without it”. 
In the opinion of this author, the initial target of 
propaganda is not the mind, but such emotions 
as fear, pride, greed, ambition, etc.78 R.L. Helvey 
agrees with J. Ellul, who defines propaganda as 
“an expression of opinions or actions taken by 
individuals or groups to influence the opinions 
and actions of other individuals or groups with 
predefined objectives and through psychological 
manipulation”79.Herewith, a retired U.S. Army 
colonel reasonably observes: “Contrary to the 
popular belief that the facts speak for themselves, 
in reality, the facts have a meaning only in a 
context”80. He also emphasizes that a journalist 
working in the genre of special propaganda, should 
imagine him-/herself as a politician. All his/her 
efforts should be aimed only at “condemning the 
opponent with all the facts that have an effect on 
the population and indicate what to do to solve the 
problem (and, unsurprisingly, political changes 
will always be an outcome)”81. R.L. Helvey also 
gives some specific recommendations on working 
with foreign mass media82.
Speaking about the role of propaganda, 
it is appropriate to recall that after World 
War I, military theorists almost unanimously 
acknowledged: promotion is a part of the art of 
war. The Englishman P.G. Warburton said: “In 
our time, the main objective of the war is not to 
destruct the enemy forces, as it was before, but 
to undermine the morale of the population of 
the enemy country as a whole to such an extent 
that it would bring its government to make 
peace”83. 
It is noteworthy that modern propaganda 
uses not so much primitive stamps, but complex, 
thoroughly elaborated strategies. J.S. Nye Jr. 
emphasizes that primitive “brainwashing” 
can cause the opposite effect. He writes: “The 
information perceived as propaganda, can be 
met not only with disdain, but also become 
counterproductive, if it undermines the credibility 
of the country”84.
A fertile field to handle the public opinion is 
television. The psychology of a viewer is that he/
she takes someone else’s opinion as his/her own, 
resulting in the situation that television does not 
reflect the reality, but mythologically interprets 
it”85. However, the development of social networks 
and blogging communities offer in this respect 
new, not yet fully investigated possibilities. 
Technologists of “nonviolent struggle” 
prepare in advance for the situation that their 
actions will cause a negative reaction of the 
authorities. As R.L. Helvey notes, “nonviolent 
actions against a repressive regime would often 
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meet violence. One can expect beatings, torture, 
imprisonment and other sanctions (violent, 
economic and social). However, when the 
government reacts in such a way, wide popularity 
of such acts can often be used by the opposition 
to gain public support for the democratic 
movement”86. To reduce the effectiveness of 
repression, the strategists of “nonviolent actions” 
use the following measures.
Firstly, they seek to win the policemen and 
other officials over to their side. R.L. Helvey 
suggests that the policemen should be influenced 
through their friends and family, bringing to them 
the idea that the opposition does not consider the 
policemen to be enemies if they are willing to 
contribute to the resistance87. It is most difficult to 
establish contact with the army, because the army 
units are often located far from the residence of 
soldiers, and in the army environment, patriotism 
and conservatism are prevailing. However, the 
author does not consider this task impossible, 
citing as an example the refusal of Serbian 
army to act in defense of Slobodan Milosevic88. 
R.L. Helvey does not write directly about 
the work carried out in the security services, 
however, as K.D. Chivers notes, the a defection 
of state security officers to the opposition played 
the leading role in the victory of the “orange 
revolution” in the Ukraine89.
R.L. Helvey considers a particularly 
important task to be “recruiting of friends and 
family of the key officials supporting the tyrant 
to the democratic opposition… The tyrant shall 
face the problem of preserving the loyalty to him/
her of those who have to arrest, intimidate and 
subject to cruel treatment the members of their 
own families”90. The work of civil and public 
officials is considered quite important. They 
may be useful for the movement, if they simply 
sabotage the work. Of course, they will bring 
even greater benefits to the opposition if they 
present the insider information.
Analyzing the “color revolutions” that took 
place in a number of the CIS countries, the Russian 
researcher A. Chadaev expressed an interesting 
opinion: “A cardboard hero needs a cardboard 
villain as a pair: and such a villain is always 
found in the face of the authorities and always 
turns out to be cardboard”91. The concern is that 
there is nothing more profitable for the organizers 
of “nonviolent struggle”, than the opposition 
threatening in words, but ineffective in practice. 
It does not matter here, if such behaviour is 
explained by incompetence and corruption of the 
law enforcement structure or purposeful work of 
the “agents of influence”. This is the case when 
stupidity is not better than cheating. 
Another aspect of the anti-repression actions 
is to raise the morale of the participants of the 
movement. According to R.L. Helvey, “obedience 
is mainly a combination of habits, fear and 
interests. Habits and interests may be changed, 
and fear can be driven away”92. Speaking about 
the organization of meetings, he demands: “Have 
a good plan, make sure that the participants 
know it, and have leaders who will ensure its 
implementation... If there is no leader in the front 
ranks of the demonstration, he/she should explain 
to the people why he/she was not there and 
where he/she would be. Leaders shall ... discuss 
measures that will not let the people feel alone. 
At public events, such as demonstrations, people 
need to keep close enough to each other to touch, 
shake hands and communicate (chant, sing and 
talk) ...Wearing similar clothing and symbols is 
a psychological support, which provides a visual 
association with others, who share the same 
values and beliefs”93. “Placing posters in front of 
the protesters and at a height that does not allow 
the demonstrators to see the ranks of the police, 
reduces fear”94. Speaking about the importance 
of the unity of the movement’s participants, 
R.L. Helvey notes: “Contrary to the patriotic 
rhetorics... very little brave actions are done out 
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of love for freedom, democracy and the rule of 
law. Most of the acts of heroism are inspired by 
loyalty and devotion to the comrades”95.
It should be emphasized that conflicts with 
the police for current social extremists are not 
unwanted trouble, but a natural element of the 
struggle, which they tend to use in accordance 
with their scenario. Strict, but ill-planned actions 
of law enforcement bodies may play into the hands 
of extremists. For example, one of the experts in 
the organization of “orange revolutions” gives 
the following advice: “If the demonstration is 
more likely to end with collisions, place young 
girls in white blouses in the front ranks. And wait 
for the police to attack. The effect is guaranteed: 
after a few strokes there will be a bit of blood 
on white blouses (or a lot, unfortunately). There 
will be excellent pictures that will spread on the 
screens all over the world... And the regime will 
be discredited”96. It is especially dangerous when 
at first the police gets susceptible of provocation 
by committing acts of violence that have the 
opposite effect, and then, under the impact of the 
agents of influence or for other reasons, it just 
‘plays back’ as mindlessly. A few cycles of this 
kind can significantly strengthen the positions of 
extremists97.
A separate section of R.L. Helvey’s work 
is dedicated to the phenomenon of leadership 
and training of leaders for strategic nonviolent 
struggle98. Attention is paid to such qualities 
as the ability to lead by example, knowledge of 
people and their problems (“for the leader of the 
local level, each person must have a name and a 
face”), as well as knowledge of the enemy, loyalty 
of the organization of “resistance”, the ability to 
take responsibility, support the success of other 
participants (and not to stick out their own role), 
learn from mistakes, develop useful skills of 
subordinates, etc. Different leadership styles 
are considered. The author points out that the 
importance of the abovementioned qualities may 
vary depending on the situation, and the choice of 
a particular leadership style is less important than 
the competence99.
R.L. Helvey specifically points out: it is 
necessary to involve religious leaders in the 
movement. If this is not possible, it is necessary 
to neutralize their impact100. Herewith, specific 
attention should be paid to certain events 
that take place in modern Russia. In January 
2012 it was reported that the Patriarch Kirill 
will not respond to a provocative letter of 
B.A. Berezovsky, who called him to join the 
“non-system opposition”101. Thereafter a 
massive campaign began to discredit the head 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in the media 
and in the Internet. The apotheosis was the 
performance of the feminist group Pussy Riot 
on February 21 at the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior, which was actively discussed in the 
media. What is happening suggests that the 
campaign is performed in accordance with 
the logic of strategic nonviolent resistance”102. 
However, it should be noted that in this 
case, the “technologists” obtained rather the 
opposite result, which was confirmed both by 
processions and other acts held by Orthodox 
Christians to protest against these actions and 
the results of public opinion polls103.
Already in 1960s intelligentsia and young 
people of the “target countries” became an 
important object of the U.S. psychological war 
operations. In particular, the programmes were 
implemented that would allow the United States 
to rely on the “elite” of the local intelligentsia and 
future political leaders in Africa104. R.L. Helvey 
writes: “raw materials for nonviolent struggle are 
people: organized, trained and skillfully led”105. 
He also notes: “In nonviolent conflicts, as in war, 
young people are in the front lines”106. At the same 
time, he mentions that for youth organizations the 
discipline is particularly important, their members 
must follow a strict “code of conduct”107. It is also 
– 1535 –
Pavel V. Klachkov. Humanitarian Technology: Strategic Nonviolent Struggle
useful to engage the business community and the 
working class in nonviolent struggle (especially 
the workers of the transport and related fields to 
ensure the transportation of people, goods and 
services)108.
At the end of 1960s, the Australian 
psychologist F. Emery studied the specific 
behaviour of young people at rock festivals 
(particularly at the famous Woodstock). As the 
result of long-term research, the researcher came 
to the conclusion that this activity reminds of 
swarming bees. The researcher also introduced 
a special term, “teenage swarm” and determined 
a relationship between this phenomenon and 
the so-called “hysteria of revolt”. Moreover, he 
concluded that such a “swarm” can be effectively 
managed for political purposes, including the 
organization of coups d’état109.
A few decades later, the results of F. Emery’s 
research complemented by achievements 
in the field of communications were used 
by the organizers of the so-called colour 
revolutions. Using social networks and mobile 
communications (in particular, for sending 
messages) the experienced coordinators manage 
revolutionary masses, guiding them in the right 
direction, quickly correcting the behaviour of 
different groups and thereby ensuring coherence 
of actions110. Anti-globalists use modern methods 
of rapid alert during their actions. These 
technologies are also the basis of the recently 
appeared practice of flash mobs: spontaneous and 
usually meaningless mass performances. Reports 
of the time, place and scenarios of the latter are 
transmitted by their participants through the 
Internet or mobile phones111.
A. Butkevicius, a Lithuanian student of 
G. Sharp, had repeatedly admitted that the 
victims of the events that occurred in January 
1991 in Vilnius, were originally planned to pay 
“little blood” for the freedom of Lithuania112. 
V. Landsbergis in his interview with the British 
journalist D. Price-Jones also explicitly stated 
that blood and heroes were needed for the 
freedom113.
The activities to consolidate the activists 
are accompanied by the efforts to alienate the 
supporters of the current government. R.L. Helvey 
emphasizes: “Keep in mind that the pressure of 
one circle works both ways, and can be used as 
a useful tool for changing behaviour patterns”114. 
As researchers note, “average people are imposed 
the fear of not being “with us”... The number of 
those “being with us” is growing like a snowball. 
A group of people, which has recently been a 
marginal sect of the opposition, rapidly acquires 
a mass of followers and supporters”115. Herewith, 
the process of discrediting and defamation of 
the supporters of the integrity of the state goes 
on, declaring them “the servants of the regime”. 
A real psychological war takes place here. 
Describing how the latter was carried out in the 
late 1980s in the Baltic, the writer V. Petkevicius 
noted: Stalinism in Lithuania was fought using 
Beria methods116. 
G. Sharp himself admits: “Sometimes 
violence is inevitably limited. Anger and 
hatred for the regime may cause an explosion. 
Moreover, some groups may continue acts 
of violence, recognizing the importance of 
nonviolent struggle. In such cases, there is no 
need to give up political disobedience, but it is 
necessary to separate violent and nonviolent acts 
as much as possible”117. The student of G. Sharp 
A. Butkevicius expressly stated that he supported 
“combined resistance”, which combined 
nonviolent and armed components118. 
If G. Sharp just slightly mentions 
international assistance that could be provided 
to the democratic movements in case of “strong 
internal resistance” (thus the author supposes that 
“countries abroad” are ready to help them, but 
they have to prove their competency), R.L. Helvey 
directly writes: international intervention can 
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weaken the regime and accelerate the collapse 
of the latter. However, a clear strategic plan is 
required, the implementation of which will not 
allow local authorities to use the “siege mentality” 
to unite the citizens. The main role here is given 
to propaganda aimed at undermining the sources 
of power: it must be applied before the invasion 
begins119.
The outcome of the tense political struggle 
is always predictable only in part. Not everything 
is defined by resources, a lot depends on the will 
and determination of the opposing parties. As 
noted by G. Sharp, “the success of nonviolent 
actions depends on a number of factors”. These 
include “the amount and the proportion of non-
cooperating and resisting people, the courage 
of the latter under the threat of repressions, 
maintaining the nonviolent discipline, and 
sometimes the pressure of the third parties. In 
some situations it is also important how open 
is the disobedience; rejection to cooperate 
undermines the credibility and legitimacy 
of the authorities, their eligibility to apply 
sanctions and penalties. It is also extremely 
important how active the existing or newly 
emerging institutions of the society become in 
the nonviolent struggle”120. 
The strategists of nonviolent struggle 
have high hopes for the phenomenon, they call 
“political jiu-jitsu”. It is a special process, “which 
can be carried out in the course of nonviolent 
struggle, changing the balance of powers. The 
negative reactions to violent repressions of the 
nonviolently resisting citizens are politically 
turned against the opponents, weakening 
their positions of power and strengthening the 
nonviolent resistance. This may work only when 
violence meets nonviolent disobedience, and 
not violence and rejection to fight”. In this case, 
repressions of the opponents appear in the worst 
light, boomeranging the public opinion against 
them in the country and abroad121.
Frankness with which R.L. Helvey writes 
about how the potential leaders of democratic 
movements can find support abroad is quite 
noteworthy. He recommends to hold negotiations 
with foreign governments “in terms of common 
interests”. As one of the arguments that can 
convince these people to support the nonviolent 
struggle, he names the promise to provide 
airspace for military flights, to ensure cooperation 
of intelligence services as soon as a favorable 
investment climate is set, and , “perhaps even 
provide space for the disposal of external forces, if 
mutual interests would be violated”122. According 
to the author, a convenient platform to announce 
the requirements of “nonviolent movements” is 
the hearings of the U.S. Congress123.
Since interaction with governments requires 
special skills and capabilities, R.L. Helvey 
also recommends to cooperate with non-
governmental organizations. At the same time, 
however, it should be understood that the support 
of nonviolent struggle is not “charity, where no 
one expects return. Those receiving help should 
consider the grant support provided as a contract. 
The contract means that in return the recipient 
must report to the donor about the number 
of members, establishment of the system of 
notification, courses, production and distribution 
of printed materials or other indicators that are 
important to achieve the objectives of the grant 
... In the field of non-governmental organizations, 
there are much more requests for support than 
resources available”124.
In order to induce people to commit acts 
irrational and destructive in their nature, “eversors” 
can pass knowingly false information through the 
mass media and the Internet, start panic rumors. 
In some cases, the purpose of the latter may be 
a “withdrawal” of psychological barriers to the 
use of violence. Studies of ethnographers and 
folklorists show that “the tradition only authorizes 
violence that is performed in the interest and on 
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the signal from the procreative sphere”125, i.e., for 
the protection of women and children. It is logical 
to assume that the most cynical manipulators will 
distribute chilling news of violence against the 
most vulnerable. Only few people may critically 
evaluate such reports in the periods of high 
emotional intensity. 
In December 1989, the reporters of the 
world media reported about the massacre, which 
allegedly took place in the Romanian city of 
Timisoara. They reported about thousands of 
victims. The apotheosis was the message that 
the Ceausescu cutthroats allegedly broke into 
the maternity hospital and ripped the bellies 
of the pregnant women open. The reports 
had photos attached. After the power went to 
the opposition, and the Ceausescu were shot, 
it turned out that the women died during 
childbirth, and the cuts appeared as the result 
of dissection. Thus, a monstrous pretence was 
organized with an understandable political 
orientation126. 
The incident in Timisoara was not the only 
one of its kind. V.N. Shved refers to the testimony 
of the citizens in the files of the case incited in 
connection with the events at the Vilnius television 
tower in January 1991. The citizens claimed to 
have seen dead bodies lying on the ground before 
the arrival of Soviet troops127. M. Collon gives 
evidence of such manipulation in the course of 
Yugoslavia events128.
Thinking about the “prospects” of such 
manipulations, it should be noted that the 
extremely favorable conditions for them are 
created by the Internet network, especially by 
social networks and blogging communities. 
Sensational reports emanating from the alleged 
“eyewitnesses” are distributed with extreme 
ease. Of course, nothing contributes better to 
the spread of false information and beginning of 
panic rumors as the atmosphere of uncertainty 
and mistrust of the population for the official 
sources of information and the inefficiency of 
state information policy129.
Speaking of the technology aimed at 
destabilizing social and political situation, it is 
important to mention the paradigm of modern 
strategic studies known as the chaos theory. 
As S. Mann points out, the latter is used for the 
study of dynamical systems, which include a 
variety of components –chaotic at the first glance, 
but easily organized by insignificant but verified 
effects130. It should be noted that the issues of 
the system behaviour under turbulent conditions 
and the emergence of order out of chaos have 
long attracted the attention of researchers. It was 
J. Schumpeter who said that “creative destruction” 
was often necessary to move forward131. However, 
the concept of S. Mann mainly deals with the 
instrumental use of the technology of chaos 
to undermine unfriendly regimes. One of the 
key concepts of his theory is “self-organized 
criticality”, i.e. the situation when even minor 
events can trigger a chain reaction that leads to 
a disaster132.
A. Toffler writes, “when the environment 
becomes too tumultuous, the systems cease to 
be linear, thus providing ample opportunities 
for small groups ... A chance, help from outside 
and the snowball effect (created with the active 
participation of the media –Author’s note): these 
are the factors that help to explain why throughout 
the history of mass democracy, extremist 
cults, revolutionary cliques and underground 
organizations ascended during the tumultuous 
confusion, why a previously insignificant small 
group may suddenly become decisive”133. An 
even more favorable situation for the radicals is 
formed in the conditions of “mosaic democracy”, 
with no unified majority134.
G. Sharp offers certain steps for transition 
after the overthrow of the dictatorship to stable 
functioning democracy135, R.L. Helvey advises 
not to let criticism of the current government 
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flow in the anarchist direction, not to abuse the 
incitement of such strong emotions as hatred and 
prejudice. Though he mentions that if the latter 
“are on the surface, they should be directed against 
the system, which gives rise to tyranny and not 
against the groups that benefit from it. And by 
limiting the concept of “enemy” to one person or a 
group at the height of power, destructive passions 
will contribute to death, exile or imprisonment of 
the leader”136.
Despite all good intentions, in practice, the 
victory of nonviolent revolutions often plunges 
the country where it occurred into chaos. As the 
Russian-Ukrainian team of researchers notes, 
“assuming the conquest of power by the crowd, 
which relies on external support, the country is 
trapped. After all, the crowd, as opposed to the 
elite set up during the revolution, is dissipated, 
and the power gets directly related to the 
hegemon, which has supported it137. Assessing 
the events of the Arab Spring, the analysts of 
the international fund Experimental Creative 
Center came to the conclusion that “the general 
plan, under which these “revolutions” have 
been initiated is the dismantling of Modernity. 
Or, in other words, the globalization of non-
development”138.
After describing the technology of 
strategic nonviolent struggle, it is logical to 
give characteristics to its essence, i.e. the “inner 
content of the subject, which is expressed in 
the unity of diverse and contradictory forms of 
its existence”139. In connection herewith, it is 
relevant to recall that social philosophy identifies 
three types of the integrity of the state: structural, 
functional, and genetic. The first one is defined 
by a unified structure of relations between the 
elements or parts of a whole, the second one, 
by correlation of various functions performed 
by various elements of the system and the third 
one, by the presence of a generating element or 
structure140.
Application of the analyzed technology 
impacts, first of all, the functional aspect of the 
integrity of the state. If the “rules of the game” 
traditionally adopted in the latter prescribe to 
treat the police or civil servants only as “screws” 
of the state apparatus that performs certain 
responsibilities, then G. Sharp and R.L. Helvey 
offer to engage these people into the network of 
public relations organized for the benefit of the 
opposition. Formally retaining their positions, 
the officials actually become the elements of the 
socio-cultural system.
An important place is given also to 
undermining of the genetic integrity of the 
state, which, as pointed out by B.S. Ebzeev 
and his co-authors, is a traditional priority for 
our country141. According to the fair remark of 
V.A. Lisichkin, “the historical past of the people 
is the basis of an integrated community”. There 
is a number of the humanitarian technologies 
aimed at the destruction of this foundation. 
Among them the substitution of the present 
problems by the references to the biasedly 
interpreted historical facts, projection of modern 
conflicts on the wars of the past (to characterize 
this method the expression «wars of memory” 
is used) and purposeful “debunking” of heroes 
and famous people, the pride of the nation. 
To occupy the places of the latter alternative 
figures may be nominated, but the practice of 
total defamation of the nation’s history is also 
known142. A. Tsuladze states, “as a result of 
“exposure” of the old myths Russia remained 
without history. There is a set of different myths 
about Russia’s past, from the left to the right, 
but there is no national, i.e. generally accepted 
myth”143. As a result, as V. Polosin correctly 
observes, “along with the history the outlines 
of the whole mythological historical space of 
the nation are lost, and the historical events 
become a chain of random facts pertaining not 
to one, but different historical subjects... The 
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people is like a child looking for his/her mother 
and father in the crowd, whose faces he/she has 
never seen”144. In the European mass media it 
has been repeatedly announced that the result of 
the Ukrainian orange revolution was to be the 
emergence of the government with a new, not 
the post-Soviet source of legitimacy. They also 
discussed the birth of the “new nation”145.
From the destruction of functional and 
genetic integrity there is a direct way to undermine 
the structural integrity of the state, the most 
important component of which is the territorial 
integrity146. If the system of the state turned 
into a simple set of people formally occupying 
certain positions, and actually acting in anti-
state interests, if historical ideas motivating 
self-sacrifice are destroyed, it is not difficult to 
eliminate the integrity of the territory, which is 
an inherent feature of the state147.
Based on the above, we can conclude 
that strategic nonviolent struggle is a complex 
humanitarian technology aimed at ensuring 
the change of state power by weakening the 
structural, functional and genetic integrity of 
the state mainly by conviction and psychological 
manipulations. A complete answer to this 
challenge includes not only opposition to 
destructive entities, but also strengthening 
of the integrity of the state by uniting three 
abovementioned types of the latter.
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Гуманитарная технология  
«стратегического ненасильственного  
сопротивления» (strategic nonviolent struggle)
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Экспертно-аналитическое управление 
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Автор рассматривает «стратегическое ненасильственное сопротивление» как комплексную 
гуманитарную технологию, направленную на обеспечение смены государственной власти 
путем ослабления структурной, функциональной и генетической целостности государства 
посредством, главным образом, убеждения и психологических манипуляций. Исследователь 
приходит к выводу, что полноценный ответ на этот вызов включает не только противодействие 
деструктивным субъектам, но и укрепление целостности государства в единстве трех 
названных выше типов последней.
Ключевые  слова: гуманитарные технологии, «мягкая сила», стратегическое ненасильственное 
сопротивление, «цветные революции».
